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Abstract
Donald Trump’s so called trade wars and the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to have a 
substantial impact on international trade flows and would probably reshape globalization. As 
trade is restricted by tariffs, global value chains are shortened and international cooperation 
becomes more difficult, there is a chance that environmental sustainability will increase due to 
lower and shorter trade flows. This paper tackles this issue by exploring the impact that recent 
American tariffs have had on the EU with a special focus in Spain. Using the SMART simulation 
model developed by the World Bank and the UNCTAD, we estimate the impact of the new tariffs 
applied to iron, steel and aluminum, the products included in the list of products affected by 
the Airbus dispute, as well as the potential new tariffs to the automotive sector. We end with a 
discussion on the effects of this new wave of protectionism on sustainability.
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Resumen
Es probable que las denominadas guerras comerciales de Donald Trump y la pandemia del 
COVID-19 tengan un impacto sustancial en los flujos comerciales internacionales y acaben por 
afectar al proceso de la globalización. A medida que el comercio se ve restringido por los arance-
les, se acortan las cadenas de valor mundiales y la cooperación internacional se hace más difícil. 
Sin que sea tampoco evidente, es posible que la sostenibilidad medioambiental pueda beneficiarse 
de este acortamiento de los flujos comerciales mundiales. Desde una óptica más humilde, este 
artículo pretende analizar las repercusiones que los recientes aranceles estadounidenses han 
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desarrollado por el Banco Mundial y la UNCTAD, estimamos el impacto de los nuevos aranceles 
aplicados al hierro, al acero y al aluminio, la lista de productos afectados por la reciente resolu-
ción de la OMC en relación a la «disputa de Airbus», así como los posibles nuevos aranceles para 
el sector de la automoción. Finalizamos con un debate sobre los efectos que podría ocasionar esta 
nueva ola de proteccionismo en la sostenibilidad medioambiental.
Palabras clave: política comercial, proteccionismo, guerra comercial, Europa, España
Clasificación JEL: F13, F14, R15
1. Introduction
Globalization and the expansion of international trade and investment accelerated 
after the fall of the Soviet Bloc under US leadership. In fact, in the last decades, 
the world economy has been experiencing an era of hyper-globalization (Rodrik, 
2018a) that seemed uncontested in the surface, but that slowly eroded trust and 
public support for the so-called liberal world order in the advanced countries due, 
in part, to sharp increases in inequality and the perceptions that the gains from trade 
were unequally distributed. This social and political discontent crystalized after the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession and led to the election of 
political leaders that openly opposed free trade and globalization (Otero-Iglesias & 
Steinberg, 2017; Rodrik, 2018b). 
US President Donald Trump, elected in 2016, was the most consequential 
of these leaders. His so-called “trade wars”, his attacks on the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and his preference for bilateral economic negotiations, thus 
neglecting multilateralism and global governance, translated in trade restrictions and 
undermined international cooperation.
However, in the middle of these economic and geopolitical tensions, the 
COVID-19 pandemic struck, putting, in the words of Carmen Reinhart, the Chief 
Economist of the World Bank “the last nail in the coffin of globalization” (Ward, 
2020). 
It is still early to know the long-term impact of the pandemic on international 
trade and globalization. The WTO estimates that international trade flows could fall 
up to 32 % in 2020 due to the lockdowns and the global recession (World Trade 
Organization, 2020), the sharpest decline in centuries.
Moreover, several scholars and commentators have suggested that the pandemic 
might lead to the acceleration of pre-existing global trends that could hamper 
international trade flows and multilateral economic governance. In particular, trade 
in manufactured goods could suffer due to a new wave of trade tensions between 
the US and China, new obstacles to international cooperation, redefinition and 
nationalization of strategic industries, regionalization of trade flows due to changes 
in the structure of global value chains, and growing discontent with economic 
liberalism in general due to the scale of the economic downturn (Mckinsey, 2019; 
Ortega, 2020; Borrell, 2020; Steinberg, 2020). However, trade in services could well 
expand due to the acceleration of digital transformation (Baldwin, 2020).
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In sum, it seems that both Trump’s tariffs and COVID-19 will lead to a 
slowdown in substantial parts of globalization and to a transformation of global 
value chains. This might have a deep negative impact in economic growth, but 
might well contribute to the fight against climate change and the achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals due to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
(United Nations, 2020).
Within this context, this paper explores the impact that the tariffs imposed (and 
announced but not yet implemented) by the Trump Administration since 2017 might 
have on the EU and Spain. Specifically, we use a partial equilibrium model (SMART) 
to estimate the impact of the new tariffs applied to the metal sector (iron, steel and 
aluminum), the products included in the list of products affected by the Boeing-
Airbus trade dispute within the WTO, as well as the potential impact of the tariffs 
announced to the automotive sector.
It is important to remark here, that our empirical application is clearly limited. In 
addition to the ones corresponding to a partial equilibrium approach, it is not able to 
address a number of relevant effects considered in the literature. For example, it does 
not consider the macroeconomic distortion introduced by the uncertainty and its 
effects over foreign direct investment (FDI) and consumption. It does not consider 
either the intermediate-demand spillover effects induced in all the other products 
that use the target products as intermediate inputs for producing other final goods 
and services. This topic has been addressed in Llano et al. (2019; 2020).
In a final section, we discuss how the results obtained here can be linked to the 
general discussion of this special issue on “Globalization and Sustainability”, also 
bringing some comments about the potential effect of the COVID-19 crisis.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Next section reviews the main 
milestones in the protectionism measures announced and adopted by the Trump 
Administration and their effects on the EU and Spain. Next, we revise the economic 
theory of the impact of tariffs on exports, and we formulate the mathematical 
equations used by the SMART simulation model. Then, we provide a descriptive 
analysis and we explain the main results obtained from our model. The paper 
concludes with an open discussion linking the protectionism measures analyzed with 
the current COVID-19 crisis and the leitmotiv of this special issue, the link between 
globalization and sustainability.
2. The recent trade war in perspective
The protectionist spirit Trump exhibited during his 2016 electoral campaign 
translated into action. In the campaign trial he promised protectionism and in 
December 4, 2018, he even tweeted “I am a tariff man”. So far, he has delivered and 
US trading partners have retaliated, leading to what has been labeled a “trade war”. 
It all started in January 2018, when the US imposed tariffs on imported washing 
machines and solar panels. On March, new import tariffs were approved on ‘iron 
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and steel’ and ‘aluminum’ of 25 % and 10 %, respectively, on the questionable bases 
that they constituted a threat to American national security. At the same time, the US 
dropped out from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), renegotiated NAFTA (now 
called USMCA) and the US-South Korea FTA, and started a trade and technological 
confrontation with China. 
Until that point, the EU had only suffered Trump’s protectionism in the form of 
limited steel and aluminum tariffs. However, on May 23rd, 2018, the Secretary of 
State for Commerce of the US initiated an investigation pursuant to section 232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to determine the impact on national security of imports 
of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts. 
The main targets seemed to be the EU (especially Germany) and Japan. On June 22, 
2018, before knowing the results of the investigation, President Trump threatened 
to impose a 20 % tariff on all imports of vehicles from the EU, also arguing that 
they were a threat to American national security. In May 2019, Trump established a 
fragile truce with Japan and the EU through a six-month postponement of new tariffs 
on vehicle imports from the EU and Japan while negotiating free-trade agreements 
with both. Moreover, in November 2019, he granted a further extension as he refused 
to nominate new judges to the Appellate Body of the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the WTO, thus effectively blocking its effectiveness, which is considered by the 
EU as one of the cornerstones of the global trading system.
Despite undermining the WTO, the Trump Administration took advantage of 
a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO to impose additional 
tariffs on EU imports. On October 18, 2019, the WTO authorized the US to adopt 
tariffs worth 7.5 billion dollars a year in compensation for the damages caused by 
the illegal aid granted by several European countries to Airbus, against the interests 
of Boeing and the laws of the free market. 
The list of authorized tariffs included, in its Section 1, products directly related to 
the aerospace sector, where tariffs could amount to 15 % and fall exclusively on the 
four European countries that produced Airbus components. Additionally, Section 2 
included a large number of items subject to maximum tariffs of 25 %, applicable to 
a much larger list of EU countries. The products in this second section had little to 
do with Airbus activity, and included items ranging from wine, olive oil, cheese, or 
zinc. The list of products is provided in the annex.
Although the nature of these US protectionist actions is completely different than 
the other unilateral (probably illegal) tariffs analyzed because they are legal under 
WTO law, they severely affected a number of European exporters and eroded the 
confidence that European authorities had that the US could, at some point, reach a 
trade deal with the EU or collaborate to reform the WTO. 
Finally, as the trade war between the US and China reach a temporary ceasefire in 
January 2020, Trump seemed determined to apply tariffs on European automobiles. 
Only the COVID-19 pandemic stopped him. 
All in all, Trump´s trade policy, summarized in his tweet “trade wars are good and 
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easy to win,” undermines the WTO, narrowly focuses on bilateral trade deficits, uses 
national security considerations to penalize allies (Bown & Cimino-Isaacs, 2017) 
and negatively affects economic growth (Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). 
With his actions, President Trump has weakened the confidence of his allies and 
continues to undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system. As Posen argues 
“U.S. President Donald Trump has rejected the idea that the world’s economies all 
benefit when they play by the rules,” “if the United States continues its retreat from 
economic leadership, it will impose serious pain on the rest of the world—and on 
itself.” (2018, p. 28).
His actions make clear that the US has no interest in resolving trade issues 
through multilateral dialogue. A G-20 initiative already underway to deal with the 
global excess steel capacity caused by China has been derailed by these actions. And 
the constructive proposals to reform the WTO seem impossible as long as Trump 
remains in the White House. Moreover, the US response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
has also shown that the US President does not believe in international cooperation. 
It has blocked the G-20 response to the pandemic and it has also withdrawn from the 
World Health Organization.
The risks are huge. If US protectionism continues and other countries retaliate, 
the world could enter a protectionist spiral like that of the 1930s (Kindleberger, 
1973). Only time will tell if Trump wins the November 2020 election or if he or his 
successor changes American trade policy. However, even with a democrat in the 
White House, it is likely that the economic and geopolitical confrontation between 
the US and China will continue. A democrat might have more interest than Trump in 
the transatlantic relation. In particular, instead of threatening European countries with 
higher tariffs if the EU does not increase agricultural imports from the US, a Biden 
Administration might resume the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) launched during the Obama Administration in 2013 and suspended when 
Trump arrived to the White House. That, as we show below, will greatly benefit both 
the EU and Spain.
3. Methodological background
The discussion about optimal procedures for an ex ante evaluation of a new tariff’s 
potential effects is broad and inconclusive, but there have been interesting reviews 
(Piermartini & Teh, 2005; WTO-UNCTAD, 2012) aiming to orient the analyses of 
both researchers and policymakers. The WTO-UNCTAD (2012) describes the virtues 
and limitations of partial equilibrium (PE) and computable general equilibrium 
(CGE), noting a tradeoff in the choice between them. CGE has advantages in the 
accountability of inter-market linkages, which is usually applicable for long-term 
analysis at the aggregate level, whereas PE is usually more suitable for short-term 
and more disaggregated policy experiments. WTO-UNCTAD (2012) also reviews a 
list of powerful models, such as SMART, GSIM, TRIST and ATPSM. 
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In this paper we have opted for the SMART simulation model, which enables us 
to estimate the main effects considered in the literature (Laird & Yeats, 1986; Laird, 
1997; Jammes & Olarreaga, 2005; Piermartini & Teh, 2005; Feenstra, 2015; and 
WTO-UNCTAD, 2012) and explains how a tariff on the imports of a given country can 
produce trade, revenue and consumer effects, both in the importing and the exporting 
country. The results depend to a large extent on the market structure, the product 
penetration in the importing country and the size of the country applying the tariff. 
We have focused on the total trade effect computed by SMART,1 which accounts 
for the trade loss2 and trade deviation effect (Laird & Yeats, 1986).
The trade loss effect captures the trade reduction induced by an increase in tariffs 
and the resulting displacement of efficient producers that were delivering their less-
expensive products in the importing country (the US in our case). Such imports will 
be replaced by less-efficient domestic products. The standard case (small country) 
assumes full transmission of price changes when tariff distortions are introduced.
The trade diversion effect, on the other hand, is the substitution of goods from one 
set of foreign suppliers for goods from another set of foreign suppliers. It results from 
changes in relative import prices (including the tariff) of goods from the different 
sets of foreign suppliers and is due to changes in the differential between the rates. 
The trade diversion effect can expand or contract trade globally, and depends on the 
current level of imports from the US and the rest of the world, the percentage increase 
in tariffs on US imports with respect to tariffs remaining unchanged (exempted 
countries) and the elasticity of substitution (EoS) of the imports from the two sources. 
The greater the elasticity of substitution, the greater the trade diversion effects.
3.1. SMART: a brief review
We compute the effect of the new tariffs using the SMART simulation model 
developed by the WTO and the UNCTAD, included in the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS). With this framework to facilitate the simulation, we use the most 
recent data on inter-national flows by country and product, as well as the updated 
TRAINS dataset for tariffs applicable to each delivery (2017). This tool enables us to 
determine the range of products subject to the tariff, computing the total trade effects 
in the exporting countries affected. This model has been used in several analyses 
(Khorana et al., 2009; Jallab et al., 2007; Gómez-Abella et al., 2013; Gaalya, 2015; 
Makochekanwa, 2014; Tian & Yu, 2014; Kabir & Salim, 2011; Munemo, 2013; and 
Pereira-Villa et al., 2012).
Following Laird and Yeats (1986) and related papers that apply SMART 
(Makochekanwa, 2014; Jammes & Olarreaga, 2005; Khorana et al., 2009; Jallab 
1 SMART also delivers price, revenue and welfare effects from tariff variation in a given country or set of 
products. We focus on the trade effects of tariffs in the RoW, avoiding discussion of these effects.
2 Usually the literature uses the concept of ‘trade creation effect’ to refer to a liberalization measure. 
To emphasize the likely negative effect of a new tariff, we instead use the concept of the ‘trade loss effect’.
 AMERICAN TARIFFS AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE EU AND SPAIN 107
Cuadernos Económicos de ICE n.o 100 · 2020/II
et al., 2007), it is now convenient to briefly revise the main equations and variables 
used by SMART in our simulation about the total trade effect of the three new tariffs.
TLiSR – Trade loss effect on commodity i imported from country R into country S.
TDiSR – Trade diversion effect on commodity i imported from R into country S.
MiSR – Imports of commodity i to country S from exporting country R.
MiSRW – Imports of commodity i by S from the rest of the world.
PiSR – Price of commodity i in country S from country R.
PisRW – Price of commodity i in country S from the rest of the world.
tiSR – Tariff (t1 and t0 refer to post- and pre-integration tariffs).
η – Import elasticity of demand in the importing country.
β – Export supply elasticity (ESE).
λ – Substitution elasticity (EoS).
The SMART simulation model measures Trade loss effect as follows:
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By default, SMART considers the same ‘import demand elasticity’ values for all 
the countries affected by the new tariff, but they may vary by product. Given that the 
product-mix within each of the sectors in our case s udy (i.e. the m tal sector; the 
automotive sector and the aerospace, agricultural and industrial sectors) is different 
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across countries, our simulation will have different import demand elasticities by 
country at that level of aggregation. Regarding the ‘elasticity of substitution’ (EoS), 
we assume the value set by default in SMART (1.5). For ‘export supply elasticity’ 
(ESE), we consider 75 a reasonable value for a big country in sectors with high 
concentration. Note that SMART assumes 99 for infinite elasticity by default for 
all products and partners, as it defaults to the case of a small country (see Equation 
[1.1]). Recently, Llano et al., 2020 analyzed the potential impact of a new tariff to 
the automotive sector, offering a sensitivity analysis with SMART using alternative 
elasticities. The results obtained in that article suggest that the values of 75 for the 
ESE and 1.5 for the EoS is reasonable for our analysis.
3.2. Trade policy scenarios
Our empirical analysis considers the following three cases with actual or potential 
effect on the EU28 and the Spanish economies: 
Case 1: the imposition of a 25 % tariff to all products included in the rubric HS-
72 “Iron and Steel” and a 10 % tariff to the HS76 “Aluminum.” All countries 
are considered as potential economies affected by the tariff except Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and South Korea. 
Case 2: the imposition of a 25 % tariff to products included in the rubrics HS-40, 
HS-84 and HS-87 referring to motor vehicles and parts. Applied only to the 
EU and to Japan. 
Case 3: the imposition of a 15 % tariff to products included in the rubric HS-
88 “Large Civil Aircraft”, applied only to France, Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. Additionally, a tariff of 25 % is imposed on a long list of 
agricultural and industrial products. In this regard, the burden of these levies 
will fall on all EU countries. More detail about the products and countries 
affected by this complex case are reported in an Annex.
In this paper, we just focus on the effects on the EU28.
The three cases are relevant for the EU because they all destroy jobs, have 
adverse effects on exports and economic growth and, crucially, they undermine 
confidence between the two largest world economies, which have been closed geo-
economic allies for more than a century. In particular, all this protectionist measures 
might trigger a transatlantic trade war with dangerous implications for international 
stability and cooperation. 
It is also important to mention, however, that the three measures are different 
in their justification and legality. Whereas the tariffs established as a retaliation for 
the Airbus subsidies are legal under WTO law, the other two are based on dubious 
national security considerations that are WTO-inconsistent.
Finally, and despite their legal and economic differences, it might be argued 
that the three measures are part of a protectionist package designed by the Trump 
Administration to rebalance the bilateral trade relation in favor of the US. The 
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strategy is based on threat and undermines multilateralism in general and the WTO-
system in particular, which are highly valued by the EU and Spain.
4. Descriptive Analysis
We start by characterizing the most recent trade relationships between the US and 
the EU28 for the three cases described before. 
TABLE 1
RANKING OF THE EXPORTERS OF METALS (HS 72&76: IRON & STEEL AND 
ALUMINUM) TO THE US 
(Thousands of Euros)
Rank Exporters Export Change in 1000 €
Export Change/World 
Export change (%)
 1 Germany –623,302 8.71
 2 Netherlands –303,043 4.24
 3 Italy –254,287 3.55
 4 Sweden –252,111 3.52
 5 United Kingdom –241,011 3.37
 6 France –200,207 2.80
 7 Spain –149,610 2.09
 8 Austria –124,379 1.74
 9 Belgium –91,778 1.28
10 Portugal –62,337 0.87
11 Finland –48,467 0.68
12 Luxembourg –34,104 0.48
13 Slovenia –31,991 0.45
14 Czech Republic –22,156 0.31
15 Poland –19,555 0.27
16 Slovak Republic –14,655 0.20
17 Switzerland –12,798 0.18
18 Romania –12,075 0.17
19 Denmark –10,989 0.15
20 Greece –6,839 0.10
21 Ireland –2,667 0.04
22 Croatia –1,917 0.03
23 Hungary –586 0,01
24 Bulgaria –555 0.01
25 Cyprus –235 0,00
26 Estonia –75 0.00
27 Latvia –48 0.00
28 Malta –12 0.00
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on data from UN Comtrade.
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In Table 1 we show the ranking of EU28 countries in relation to their most 
recent figures of exports to the US of the metal’s products affected by the first 
tariffs analyzed (HS 72&76). The results show a strong concentration of the effects 
in Germany, followed by The Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, UK and France. Spain 
remains in the 7th position, representing 2.09 % of the total trade reduction of the 
impact over the whole World. To this regard, it is important to remember that the 
main aim of this tariffs was to reduce the US imports coming from non-EU countries 
such as China and Russia. Indeed, the EU28 almost managed to be exempted from 
the tariffs.
In Table 2 we show the US trade deficit with the world (last column) as well as 
with each of the four European countries sanctioned in the Airbus dispute. Rows 
include only the first 30 products on the list, ordered from highest to lowest in relation 
to their trade deficit between the US and the world. The data comes from Comtrade 
(UN), they are expressed in millions of dollars and refer to 2018. For clarity, in 
the last row of the table the total bilateral balance of the US is added with each of 
these markets. Likewise, together with each record by rows, the last row records 
the percentage that the bilateral balance of each product in the ranking represents 
over the total bilateral balance, expressed in absolute value. Thus, for example, 
in 2018 the US registered a trade deficit with the world of 946 billion dollars, of 
which 1.6 % corresponds to the product “6110. Sweaters, pullovers…”, included in 
the list of affected products. This item would hardly be of relative importance in 
the bilateral balances with the four European guilty countries, knowing that even 
in the exchanges with Germany and the UK, the bilateral balance of said product is 
positive for the US. The case of the following balance in the ranking is somewhat 
different: it would be the product “8803. Parts of new civil aircraft...”, this item, 
directly linked to the aerospace sector, would account for 1.4 % of the total US 
trade deficit with the world, which accounts for 34.2 % of the US negative bilateral 
balance with the United Kingdom, 10.7 % with France, 1.9 % with Spain or 0.5 % 
with Germany.
Remarkable is also the case of product “2208. Grape Brandy...”, which accounts 
for up to 40.5% of the US-UK bilateral balance, while 15.1% with France or 2.1 % 
with Spain. 
The case of item “880240. New aircraft for civil use” is also significant, since it 
represents 21.2 % of the US-France bilateral balance or 2.3 % of the US-Germany. 
Another unique case for Spain would be that of the product “1509. Olive oil…”, with 
a bilateral balance of -438.34 million euros, which represents 11% of the bilateral 
trade deficit observed between the US and Spain in 2018.
All these figures indicate that, even if the United States imposed a 100% tariff on 
all these items, until imports of these products-origins were completely cut off, the 
overall effect on the US bilateral and absolute deficit would be limited, although not 
negligible.
Table 3, identifies the Ranking of the EU28 based on their exports to the US 
imports of motor vehicles for the last three years available (2016-2018).
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What immediately stands out is the share of cars in total US imports (HS-87); 
they represent 12.19 %. Also noteworthy is the strong concentration of flows in three 
sources: Germany (4.64%), United Kingdom (1.73 %) and Italy (0.97 %). 
Spain appears in 6th position, with a narrow share of 0.26 % of the sector’s total 
world exports to the US.
We now turn our attention to the weight of exports from the automotive sector 
(HS87) in the total exports that each of these countries dispatches to the US (fourth 
column of Table 3). The most exposed country here is Slovakia, 68.55 % of whose 
TABLE 3
US IMPORTS OF MOTOR VEHICLES: THE 28 COUNTRIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION. AGGREGATE FIGURES, 2016-2018 
(Millions of €)





(1) (2) = 1/Total (1) (3) (4) = 1/3
Total USA (rest of the world) 1,499,262 100,00 12,299,351 1,219
1 Germany 69,559 4.64 308,508 22.55
2 United Kingdom 25,913 1.73 144,570 17.92
3 Italy 14,585 0.97 130,454 11.18
4 Sweden 6,676 0.45 28,531 23.40
5 Slovakia 5,716 0.38 8,339 68.55
6 Spain 3,918 0.26 40,659 9.64
7 Hungary 3,424 0.23 13,376 25.60
8 Austria 2,927 0.20 31,143 9.40
9 Finland 2,610 0.17 15,373 16.98
10 Belgium 2,267 0.15 42,963 5.28
11 France and Monaco 1,892 0.13 128,191 1.48
12 Netherlands 1,503 0.10 51,186 2.94
13 Poland 975 0.07 18,434 5.29
14 Czech Republic 716 0.05 12,230 5.85
15 Romania 334 0.02 5,916 5.64
16 Denmark 171 0.01 21,139 0.81
17 Portugal 135 0.01 9,324 1.45
18 Greece 117 0.01 3,718 3.15
19 Slovenia 70 0.00 2,062 3.37
20 Ireland 22 0.00 128,970 0.02
21 Luxembourg 21 0.00 1,361 1.53
22 Bulgaria 17 0.00 1,974 0.85
23 Latvia 7 0.00 1,323 0.57
24 Estonia 7 0.00 2,220 0.33
25 Croatia 5 0.00 1,231 0.41
26 Lithuania 3 0.00 3,523 0.09
27 Malta 1 0.00 1,409 0.05
28 Cyprus 0 0.00 147 0.03
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on data from UN Comtrade.
 AMERICAN TARIFFS AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE EU AND SPAIN 113
Cuadernos Económicos de ICE n.o 100 · 2020/II
exports to the US are concentrated in this sector. It is followed by Hungary (25.6 %) 
and Sweden (23.40 %). The share of automotive exports in Spain’s total exports to 
the US is relatively low (9.64 %) — lower than it is in Germany (22.55 %), the UK 
(18 %) or Italy (11.18 %).
5. Results
With the previous figures in mind, we now turn to review the most salient results 
obtained in our simulations using SMART, with a focus on the trade effects over the 
EU28.
5.1. Results: A general overview
To start, Figure 1 shows the total effects obtained using our preferred scenarios 
(EoS = 1.5; ESE = 75) for the three cases considered, with the countries ranked in 
decreasing order. 
As expected, the largest effects in terms of export reductions concentrate in 
the countries that faced a higher exposure to the US market in the three sectors 
considered, namely, Germany, UK, Italy and France. Spain appears in the sixth 
position. Therefore, the impact is moderate if it is compared to its relative size within 
the EU, and especially if one takes into account that Spain is the second EU largest 
car producer. 
FIGURE 1 
RANKING OF THE TOTAL TRADE EFFECT BY THE EU28 COUNTRIES 
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In addition to the relative position of each country, it is also relevant to consider 
the share of each of the three cases within each total effect, which suggests that the 
largest impacts might be generated by the tariffs to the automotive sector, followed 
by the metals and the measures adopted in relation to the Airbus WTO dispute. Thus, 
the two measures already at play have the lowest impacts, while the potential new 
measure (those on cars) might have the largest.
Complementary, Figure 2 shows in three alternative maps the trade effects 
obtained for the baseline scenario (ESE = 75; EoS = 1.5), measure in relative terms to 
the country GDP in 2018 (all measure in current $). The maps use 10 different colors, 
where the categories are defined using natural brakes, as the best way to identify the 
FIGURE 2 
TOTAL EXPORT CHANGE OF THE THREE CASES 
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heterogeneity of impacts by countries. To better interpret the Maps, is important to 
consider that, since the effects are mainly negative, the lighter the color the higher 
the impact.
In this case, the largest overall impact corresponds to Slovakia (–0.8 % of its 
2018 GDP), followed by Hungary (–0.4 %), Germany (–0.3 %), Sweden (–0.3 %), 
UK (–0.2 %), Austria (–0.2 %) or Finland (–0.2 %), while the impact on the Spanish 
economy remains in a moderate –0.1 %.
Thus, the relative importance of the impact in percentage of the GDPs offers 
a different view to the absolute value impact, something that can be explained by 
the largest GDPs of the main countries affected, as well as the high specialization 
in some of the products targeted in certain countries (i.e. car industry in Slovakia 
and Hungary). Even with that, the impact in relative terms to the German’s GDP 
is substantial, while the one for Spain remains in an upper-middle range, below its 
economic size in the EU.
Finally, Table 4 shows the ranking of the main “country-product” dyads according 
to their total export decrease as predicted in our simulation using SMART and the 
preferred scenarios. Consistently with the previous results, the eight first main 
impacts concentrate in products related in the automotive sector, with a prevalence 
in Germany, and less intensely, in the UK, Italy or France. Note that for each flow, 
the total trade effect is decomposed in the two components provided by the SMART 
simulation, that is, the trade loss effect and the deviation effect. To this regard, in 
most cases, the negative effect is due to the trade loss effect, which accounts for 
about 60 % of the total in the main flows.
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TABLE 4
RANKING OF THE MAIN ‘COUNTRY-PRODUCT’ AFFECTED BY THE TARIFFS 
IN TERMS OF TOTAL TRADE EFFECT, AND ITS TWO COMPONENTS: 
DESTRUCTION VS. DIVERSION 
(SMART simulation using: ESE=75; EOS=1.5)
Rank Country Product Trade total effect Trade_Destruction Trade_DiversionHS code 1,000 euros 1,000 euros % 1,000 euros %
 1 Germany 870323 –4,677,728 –2,826,743 60 –1,789,436 38
 2 Germany 870324 –1,502,234 –883,252 59 –599,215 40
 3 U. K. 870323 –1,153,904 –705,980 61 –432,741 38
 4 Italy 870323 –1,117,024 –683,493 61 –418,833 37
 5 U. K. 870324 –1,068,775 –630,750 59 –423,963 40
 6 France 880240 –586,767 –343,507 59 –235,540 40
 7 Germany 840734 –571,627 –283,167 50 –280,938 49
 8 Sweden 870323 –564,468 –345,963 61 –211,078 37
 9 Germany 72 –532,582 –441,230 83 –86,005 16
10 Germany 870840 –529,102 –329,951 62 –192,189 36
11 U. K. 220830 –527,369 –367,328 70 –153,102 29
12 Germany 840820 –480,421 –480,421 100 0 0
13 U. K. 870322 –469,619 –175,621 37 –287,819 61
14 Italy 870324 –430,046 –255,089 59 –169,298 39
15 Slovakia 870323 –397,551 –243,778 61 –148,542 37
16 Germany 880240 –371,397 –220,894 59 –145,616 39
17 Hungary 870323 –366,392 –224,691 61 –136,879 37
18 Austria 840820 –362,660 –362,660 100 0 0
19 Finland 870323 –349,177 –214,145 61 –130,437 37
20 U. K. 870333 –341,131 –341,131 100 0 0
21 Germany 870829 –331,772 –166,049 50 –161,358 49
22 Netherlands 72 –287,532 –224,404 78 –60,644 21
23 Sweden 72 –244,358 –208,332 85 –33,537 14
24 Spain 870323 –241,483 –148,144 61 –90,162 37
25 Slovakia 870324 –220,837 –131,198 59 –86,733 39
26 Germany 870899 –220,499 –71,536 32 –146,062 66
27 U. K. 72 –217,502 –163,023 75 –52,205 24
28 Italy 72 –207,282 –179,482 87 –25,713 12
29 Belgium 870323 –174,306 –106,953 61 –65,059 37
30 France 72 –172,110 –151,212 88 –19,310 11
31 Germany 870894 –168,393 –83,051 49 –83,126 49
32 Germany 840991 –164,742 –114,319 69 –48,255 29
33 Germany 840999 –160,566 –75,392 47 –83,061 52
34 Italy 840820 –153,897 –153,897 100 0 0
35 U. K. 840734 –149,586 –76,379 51 –71,239 48
36 Germany 870850 –137,460 –57,273 42 –78,378 57
37 Austria 840734 –134,233 –68,603 51 –63,864 48
38 Germany 870830 –132,021 –64,056 49 –66,228 50
39 Spain 72 –127,475 –108,770 85 –17,860 14
40 Netherlands 870323 –127,203 –78,061 61 –47,468 37
41 Austria 870324 –114,300 –67,958 59 –44,838 39
42 Germany 401110 –112,455 –36,009 32 –74,967 67
43 U. K. 870332 –111,034 –111,034 100 0 0
44 Netherlands 721012 –106,105 –79,782 75 –24,927 23
45 Austria 72 –102,326 –85,075 83 –16,240 16
46 Spain 840991 –100,461 –69,847 70 –29,292 29
47 Germany 76 –83,662 –74,611 89 –8,395 10
48 Belgium 72 –82,501 –69,177 84 –12,645 15
49 Germany 870880 –79,248 –19,459 25 –58,746 74
50 Germany 721012 –79,184 –59,946 76 –18,195 23
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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5.2. Further discussion: impacts on sustainability
Now it is time to connect the previous analysis with the leitmotiv of this special 
issue, as well as with the dramatic crisis we are all experiencing due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
There is a tradeoff between globalization and sustainability (Cherniwchan, 
et al, 2017; Copeland, et al., 2004). International trade and the fragmentation of 
the production chain imply that the intermediate products (part and components) 
embodied in each good and service travel larger distances and generates heavier 
GHG emissions. As mentioned in the introduction, protectionism measures and 
trade conflicts push against globalization, promoting the insourcing of (part) of the 
fragmented stages of production in favor of the domestic economy.
For example, Cristea et al. (2013) studied the GHG emissions associated with 
international trade using origin-destination flows by mode for the whole world. 
These authors collect extensive data on worldwide trade by transport mode and use 
it to provide detailed comparisons of GHG emissions associated with output versus 
international transport of traded goods. According to their analysis, international 
transport is responsible for 33% of worldwide trade-related emissions and over 75% 
of emissions for major manufacturing categories. Their approach covers emissions 
associated with both the production (output) and the transport of goods to destinations 
abroad and allows them to distinguish between the two. Moreover, for the latter they 
also consider the scale effect (i.e. changes in emissions due to changes in demand 
for international transport) and the composition effect (i.e. changes in the transport 
mode mix). They conclude that including transport dramatically changes the ranking 
of countries by emissions per dollar of trade. They go on to investigate whether trade 
inclusive of transport can lower emissions. In one quarter of cases, the difference 
in output emissions is more than enough to compensate for the emissions cost of 
transport. The main limitation of their approach is to consider international trade in 
isolation from internal freight flows, which in most countries account for a larger 
share of economic activity.
Complementary, Yang et al. (2019), analyzed the environmental implications of 
the inter-national and inter-regional trade in China, considering the production and 
consumption side of the issue, measuring the potential impact on the emissions in 
a hypothetical scenario of no-trade, a very relevant scenario within the COVID-19 
pandemic.
To this regard, it is expected that the current COVID-19 shock will push economies 
towards security against efficiency and to shorten value chains. This natural inbound 
movement is expected to produce similar results than a wave of protectionism, in 
this case, based on real national security reasons. This will probably lead to lower 
GHG emissions.
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6. Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to estimate the impact of recent American tariffs 
on European economies. The results are relevant in several dimensions. The impacts 
obtained show that trade effects can create important reductions in output and 
employment in the EU, with a special impact on Germany, the UK, Italy and France. 
The impact over the Spanish economy will be important, ranking 6th in the context 
of the entire EU28.
According to our results, the largest impacts might be generated by the tariffs to 
the automotive sector (which had not been yet imposed as this paper went to press), 
followed by the metals and the tariffs related to the Boeing-Airbus dispute. Thus, the 
two measures already at play have the lowest impacts, but the worst shock, by far, is 
still pending on Trump’s final decision about cars.
As commented before, the analysis conducted here is limited, and opens several 
lines of future research. On the one hand, we assume the limitations corresponding 
to a partial equilibrium approach, able to tackle just with the trade loss/deviation 
effects. To this regard, we expect to complement our current analysis incorporating 
a input-output analysis, computed at the international and interregional level, which 
includes the additional spillover effects caused by the intermediate demand between 
countries (WIOD tables) and regions within Spain (SIRIO tables). A first article 
has been published for the case of the metals (Llano et al, 2019), while other two 
are in preparation, for the other two cases. Furthermore, it will be interesting to 
incorporate additional macro-economic effects such as the ones linked to the rise in 
uncertainty and its heterogenous effects by sectors and countries, something that has 
been recently addressed by several relevant reports (European Central Bank, 2018; 
2019).
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 current crisis and the way in which the EU and its 
member states are managing it, might introduce new barriers to the free movement of 
goods, services, people and capital. As commented before, this could trigger a general 
reaction of families, firms and nations towards retracting in favor of regionalization 
and the domestic economies, giving the last push to the hyper-globalization process 
observed in the previous decades. 
In sum, in this paper we try to link the trade war, which drove the main discussion 
of the IMF and European Central Bank (ECB) global outlooks in the last autumn, 
with the lemma of this current special issue, and with the current COVID-19 crisis, 
that will define how our lives proceed in the coming years.
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Part 4 25 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
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PRODUCTS INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF PRODUCTS AFFECTED BY THE
BOEING-AIRBUS TRADE DISPUTE WITHIN THE WTO
Based on the WTO verdict, the US Ministry of Commerce has published the list 
of products on which the new tariffs will fall from October 18. The list considers 
two sections. In this Annex we give more information about the product-country list 
considered in that protectionism measure, and how they have been introduced in our 
simulation.
The products that are enumerated and described in Section 1 of this Annex are 
being considered for additional import duties if they are the product of any of the 
following four member States of the European Union: France, Germany, Spain or 
the United Kingdom.
The products that are enumerated and described in Section 2 of this Annex are 
being considered for additional import duties if they are the product of any of the 
twenty-eight member States of the European Union.
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(%) Affected countries Affected products EoS ESE
Part 5 25 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 






Part 6 25 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 






Part 7 25 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdon
40690 1.5 75
Part 8 25 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdon
40690 1.5 75
Part 9 25 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdon
40690 1.5 75
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Part 12 25 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdon
160249 1.5 75





Part 14 25 Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdon
220870 1.5 75








Part 16 25 France and Germany 821490 1.5 75
